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ABSTRACT 
Two axioms in the measurement of inequality and poverty which are widely perceived to be 
innocuous and unexceptionable - although they have both been challenged in the literature - 
are the Scale Invariance Axiom and the Replication Invariance Axiom. These axioms have 
endorsed an essentially relative approach (with respect to income-size and population-size 
respectively) to the measurement of inequality and poverty. The present paper is an 
expository essay which aims to clarify the logical and ethical limitations of either a purely 
relative or a purely absolute approach to distributional measurement. In the process, it also 
reviews two proposals - due to Manfred Krtscha and Eduardo Arriaga respectively - for 
‘intermediate’ measures of inequality and poverty, which moderate the ‘extreme’ values 
underlying relative and absolute measures by combining these opposing values in a simple 
product formula. 
Key Words: Scale Invariance, Translation Invariance, Unit Consistency, Replication 
Invariance, Replication Scaling, Population Replication Principle   
RESUME 
Les axiomes d’échelle invariante et de réplication invariante, sont deux axiomes de la 
mesure de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté largement perçus comme inoffensifs et irrécusables, 
bien qu'ils aient tous deux été contestés dans la littérature. Ces axiomes ont appuyé une 
approche essentiellement relative (par rapport au revenu  et à la population, respectivement) 
de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté. Cet article vise à clarifier les limites logiques et éthiques 
d’une mesure soit purement relative, soit purement absolue. Il examine également deux 
propositions - suivant Manfred Krtscha et Eduardo Arriaga respectivement - des mesures 
«intermédiaires» de l'inégalité et de la pauvreté, qui modèrent les valeurs «extrêmes» des 
mesures sous-jacentes relatives et absolues en combinant ces valeurs opposées dans une 
formule simple. 
Mots-clés: Échelle d’Invariance, Invariance, Unité de cohérence, Réplication Invariante, 
Echelle de réplication, Principe de réplication de la population. 
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 Policeman: What are you doing with that elephant? 
Character played by Jimmy Durante: Elephant? What elephant? 
                                                                                                 - Billy Rose’s Jumbo 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two conceptual problems - among several others - which confront the analyst of inequality 
and poverty are what may be called the Problem of Variable Size and the Problem of 
Variable Populations. Stated loosely, the Variable Size Problem is concerned with how our 
judgements on inequality and poverty ought to respond to changes in the size of the 
distribution under consideration, while the Variable Populations Problem is concerned with 
how our judgements on inequality and poverty ought to respond to changes in the size of the 
population under consideration. In this paper, we shall be concerned with the Variable Size 
Problem as it applies to the measurement of inequality, and the Variable Populations 
Problem as it applies to the measurement of poverty. 
In the literature on the measurement of inequality and poverty, the approach most widely 
resorted to in addressing the two Problems mentioned above has been to invoke two specific 
invariance postulates - the Scale Invariance Axiom and the Replication Invariance Axiom 
respectively. In the context of inequality measurement, Scale Invariance requires that the 
value of the chosen measure should be invariant with respect to any uniform scaling up or 
scaling down of a distribution. In the context of poverty measurement, Replication 
Invariance requires that the value of the chosen measure should be invariant with respect to 
any uniform replication of the population. The two invariance conditions have ensured that 
the favoured interpretation of inequality and poverty indices, in the bulk of the relevant 
literature, has been in terms of these being relative rather than absolute indices. 
The predominant view which prevails in the literature has not, however, gone unchallenged. 
Where inequality is concerned, there is a long - even if not widely accepted nor even 
acknowledged - tradition that has dealt with the merits of absolute, as also of ‘intermediate’, 
measures of inequality. Salient contributions to this literature would include the work of, 
among others, Kolm (1976a, 1976b), Moyes (1987), Bossert (1990a), Bossert and Pfingsten 
(1990), Krtscha (1994), Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (1998, 2009), Del Rio and Ruiz-
Castillo (2000, 2001), Atkinson and Brandolini (2004), Yoshida (2005), Jenkins and Jantti 
(2005), Zheng (2007), Del Rio and Alonso-Villar (2008, 2011), Azpitarte and Alonso-Villar 
(2011), Bosmans, Decancq and Decoster (2011), and, importantly, Zoli (2012). Similarly, 
where poverty (and a set of related issues) is concerned, there is a strand of the literature 
which has questioned an unqualified endorsement of the Replication Invariance Axiom. The 
relative approach to poverty assessment, with its emphasis on the proportion of the 
population in poverty, has been sought to be contrasted with an absolute approach that 
emphasizes the numbers of people in poverty, or some less extreme ‘intermediate’ 
compromise between the relative and the absolute approaches. Contributions to this strand of 
the literature would include, among others, Kundu and Smith (1983), Bossert (1990b), 
Paxton (2003), Chakravarty, Kanbur and Mukherjee (2006), Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007), 
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Hassoun (2010), Hassoun and Subramanian (2012), Subramanian (2000, 2002, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), and Zoli (2009). 
It is worth noting that a distinguished response to the Variable Size Problem in inequality 
measurement is constituted by an ‘intermediate’ measure due to Krtscha (1994), which is 
simply the product of two other very well-known measures of inequality, one of which - the 
coefficient of variation - is a relative measure, and the other - the standard deviation - is an 
absolute measure. Similarly, an appealing ‘resolution’ of the Variable Populations Problem 
in poverty measurement (originally conceived of in the context of a precisely analogous 
problem in the measurement of urbanization) is due to Arriaga (1970), who pointed to the 
plausibility of a measure which happens to be, quite simply, a product of two very well-
known measures, one of which - the headcount ratio - is a relative measure, and the other - 
the aggregate headcount - is an absolute measure. 
The foregoing introduction is an account of the principal ingredients of this paper. These are: 
 (a) two widely-employed invariance conditions in the axiomatics of inequality and poverty 
measurement, namely the Scale Invariance and the Replication Invariance conditions, which 
are compatible with the advancement of relative measures; 
(b) the postulation of alternative Variable Size and Variable Populations axioms which are 
compatible with the advancement of absolute measures; and 
(c) the further postulation of intermediate measures, such as the Krtscha Index of Inequality 
and the Arriaga Index of Urbanization/Poverty which are essentially manifestations of a 
simple product rule in terms of which the relevant intermediate measures are derived as a 
product of the corresponding relative and absolute measures. 
The paper is organized as follows. The introductory section is followed by one dealing with 
the preliminaries of concepts and definitions. Next, the Variable Size Problem in inequality 
measurement is reviewed, and this is succeeded by a treatment of the Variable Populations 
Problem in poverty measurement. A final section discusses the analogous nature of the two 
Problems and their similar resolution through the deployment of a ‘product rule’, whereby 
relative and absolute approaches to assessment are sought to be reconciled in some 
appropriate ‘intermediate’ compromise. 
This paper is written on the premise that it is a matter of some importance to assimilate the 
employment of intermediate measures of inequality and poverty on a  routine basis into 
mainstream theoretical and empirical studies of the phenomena of inequality and poverty, as 
constituting sensibly moderate compromises between the arguably ‘extreme’ value-
orientation of purely relative and purely absolute measures. This will entail a quick review of 
the previous work of a number of writers on the subject of enquiry. The objective of the 
paper will therefore be geared to the ends of recollection and exposition of an important 
though arguably relatively neglected strand of the literature. 
2. PRELIMINARY FORMALITIES 
We let ix  stand for the (non-negative) income of person i ),...,1( ni   in a community of 
n )1(  individuals constituting a set designated by N . An income distribution is an n-
vector of incomes ),...,,...,( 1 ni xxxx . nX  is the set of all income n-vectors, and X is the 
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set of all conceivable income distributions, given by: nn XX N  , where N is the set of 
positive integers. We shall let R stand for the set of real numbers, and R  for the set of 
positive reals. A poverty line is a positive real number z  such that individuals with incomes 
less than z are certified to be poor. Given any set of individuals N, the set of poor 
individuals in N is designated by Q(N), and the set of non-poor individuals by )(NR  (so 
))()( NNRNQ  .  For all Xx , Qx  will stand for the sub-vector of poor incomes, and 
Rx  for the sub-vector of non-poor incomes (so ),( RQ xxx  ). For all Xx , )(xμ  will 
stand for the mean, and )(xn for the dimensionality, of the distribution x. Also, a distribution 
x is a perfectly equal distribution if )(xμxi   for all )(,...,1 xni  ; and it is a perfectly 
concentrated distribution if 0[ ix  for all }{\)(,...,1 jni x and )()( xx μnx j   for some 
j]. 
An inequality measure is a mapping R: XI  such that, for every income-vector x 
belonging to X, I specifies a unique real number which is intended to capture the extent of 
inequality associated with x.  A poverty measure is a mapping RR:  XP  such that, 
for every income-vector x belonging to X and every (positive) poverty line z, P specifies a 
unique real number which is intended to capture the extent of poverty associated with the 
regime );( zx . 
An inequality measure will be said to satisfy (a) the Transfer Axiom (Axiom T) if its value 
declines in the presence, other things equal, of a rank-preserving progressive (that is, richer 
person-to-poorer person) transfer of income; (b) the Symmetry Axiom (Axiom S) if its value is 
invariant with respect to a permutation of incomes among individuals; (c) the Continuity 
Axiom (Axiom C) if it is continuous on nX  for every Nn  (so that minor changes in an 
income distribution do not produce discontinuously abrupt changes in the value of the 
measure); and (d) the Positive Responsiveness Axiom (Axiom PR) if, in a two-person world, 
its value increases when, other things equal, the richer person’s income increases. We shall 
confine attention to the class of inequality measures which are symmetric. Arguably, 
Transfer, Symmetry, Continuity and Positive Responsiveness are reasonable properties for 
an inequality index to satisfy.  
Given any poverty line z, a poverty measure will be said to satisfy (a) the Income Focus 
Axiom (Axiom IF) if its value is invariant with respect to an increase in a non-poor person’s 
income; (b) the Symmetry Axiom (Axiom S*), if its value is invariant with respect to a 
permutation of incomes among individuals; (c)  the Continuity Axiom (Axiom C*) if it is 
continuous in poor incomes; (d) the Monotonicity Axiom (Axiom M) if its value declines, 
other things equal, with an increase in the income of a poor person; and (e) The Weak 
Transfer Axiom (Axiom T*) if its value declines when, other things equal, there is a transfer 
of income from a non-poor person to a poor person that keeps the numbers of individuals on 
either side of the poverty line unchanged. We shall confine attention to the class of poverty 
measures which are symmetric. Arguably, Symmetry, Monotonicity, Continuity and Weak 
Transfer are reasonable properties for a poverty index to satisfy.          
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3. INEQUALITY AND THE VARIABLE SIZE PROBLEM 
How (if at all) should the value of an inequality measure change with a change in the size of 
a distribution? The most commonly employed axiom, in this context, is the so-called Scale 
Invariance Axiom (Axiom SI):  
Scale Invariance (Axiom SI): An inequality measure R: XI satisfies Scale Invariance if 
and only if, for all Xx and all Rλ , )()( xx λII  .   
Under Scale Invariance, inequality in the distribution of a cake is independent of its size so 
long as the proportions of cake going to each individual are preserved: equal proportionate 
increases in the amount going to each individual will leave the extent of measured inequality 
unchanged. Measures of inequality which satisfy Scale Invariance are also called relative 
measures. A well-known relative measure of inequality is the coefficient of variation (CV), 
which is given, for all Xx , by: 
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CV . 
Scale Invariance also implies neutrality to the units of measurement, namely the property 
that the value of an inequality measure should be invariant with respect to the units (for 
example, rupees or francs) in which income is measured. Such neutrality has often been 
considered to be an indispensable feature of an inequality index. It is possible that this belief 
has played a major role in explaining the near-universal appeal which relative measures of 
inequality seem to enjoy in the inequality literature.  
In this connection, it must be pointed out that neutrality to the units of measurement might be 
a needlessly strong requirement. Zheng (2007) has advanced an attractively weaker 
condition called Unit Consistency, which requires not the cardinal property of value-
neutrality but the ordinal property of ranking-neutrality: that is to say, unit-consistency 
demands only that the ranking (and not necessarily the value) of any pair of distributions 
should be invariant with respect to the units in which income is measured. 
Unit Consistency (Axiom UC). An inequality measure R: XI satisfies Unit Consistency 
if and only if, for all Xyx , , if )()( yx II  , then )()( yx λIλI  for any Rλ . 
The perceived virtue of the property of value-neutrality has arguably precluded sufficient 
engagement with the positive and normative limitations of relative inequality measures. At 
the positive level, and as Subramanian (2013a) points out in the context of two-person 
distributions, Scale Invariance is incompatible with Positive Responsiveness. (If )1,0(x  
and )100,0(y , then )()( yx II    by Scale Invariance, whereas )()( yx II   by Positive 
Responsiveness.) If one holds the view that it is hard to quarrel with the reasonableness of 
Positive Responsiveness, then this does leave Scale Invariance somewhat exposed. At the 
normative level, and as Kolm (1976a,b) has pointed out, in the presence of income-growth, 
relative measures of inequality are pronouncedly ‘rightist’ in their value-orientation: a 
relative measure cannot differentiate between the distributions )50,1(x and )100,2(y , 
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even though the absolute gap between the two persons’ incomes is twice as large in the 
distribution y as in the distribution x. Perhaps as a reaction to the extreme conservatism 
(under income-growth) of Scale Invariance, an alternative invariance condition has been 
postulated in the literature, one which sees invariance as being preserved not under equal 
proportionate increases in all incomes, but under equal absolute increases in all incomes. 
This is the property of Translation Invariance (see Kolm 1976a, b):  
Translation Invariance (Axiom TI): An inequality measure R: XI satisfies Translation 
Invariance if and only if, for all Xx and all Rt , )()( txx  II , where ),...,( ttt  
and )()( xt nn  . 
Under Translation Invariance equal absolute increases or decreases in the amount of income 
going to each individual will leave the extent of measured inequality unchanged. Measures 
of inequality which satisfy Translation Invariance are also called absolute measures. A well-
known absolute measure of inequality is the standard deviation of incomes (SD), a mean-
dependent measure which is simply the coefficient of variation scaled by the mean income 
and given, for all Xx , by: 
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Absolute measures of inequality, being mean-dependent, will obviously violate the property 
of neutrality to units of measurement, although they need not fall foul of the property of Unit 
Consistency: this, as it happens, is true for the Standard Deviation measure. Thus, if Unit 
Consistency is seen as an adequate substitute for the arguably excessively strong condition of 
value-neutrality, then an absolute measure of inequality such as the standard deviation might 
be seen as an acceptable alternative to the more standard formulation of relative measures. 
However, it can be shown that absolute measures, like relative measures, are also suspect 
from both positive and normative perspectives. 
Subramanian (2013a) has shown, by means of a simple example relating to two-person 
distributions, that a Translation-Invariant inequality measure could violate the property of 
Continuity if it is also required to be able to differentiate a perfectly equal distribution of 
incomes from a perfectly concentrated one. (If )100,99(),1,0(  vx and )100,100(y , 
then )()( vx II   by Translation Invariance, and )()( yv II   by Continuity, whence 
)()( yx II  , that is, a perfectly concentrated distribution (x) is assessed as displaying 
virtually the same extent of inequality as a perfectly equal distribution (y).) Apart from this 
problem of logical coherence, absolute measures may also fail to be wholly normatively 
appealing. It is well known that under Translation Invariance, equal decrements in income 
must be treated the same way as equal increments, so that the distribution x = (1 million, 2 
million) must be judged to exhibit the same extent of inequality as the distribution y = (0, 1 
million): this surely involves the assertion of a questionable moral equivalence, given that x 
is a distribution describing two millionaires while y is a distribution relating to a destitute 
and a millionaire.   
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If Kolm pronounced relative inequality measures to be ‘rightist’ in the presence of income-
growth, he also pronounced absolute inequality measures to be ‘leftist’ in the presence of 
income-growth (Kolm 1976a, b). This leads to the question: is there a moderate middle-
ground between the extreme value-orientations of rightist measures and leftist measures? 
Such a compromise might be located in what Kolm (1976a, b) refers to as ‘intermediate 
inequality measures’, which are measures that register a rise in value with an equal 
proportionate increase in all incomes, and a decline in value with an equal absolute increase 
in all incomes: 
Intermediate Inequality Measure: An inequality measure R: XI is intermediate if and 
only if, for all distributions Xx  which are not perfectly equal distributions and all 
R,tλ , (a) )()( xx λII   and (b) )()( txx  II , where ),...,( ttt  and )()( xt nn  . 
Krtscha (1994) has proposed an approach to the Variable Size Problem which entails an 
invariance postulate of the following nature (explicated in Subramanian 2013b). Suppose x 
and y are two distributions of the same dimensionality n and with means )(xμ  and )(yμ  
respectively, with )()( xy μμ  . Let x  be a distribution obtained from x in such a way that 
the first incremental rupee in the transition from x to y is   split into two halves, with the first 
half distributed in the same proportions as in x and the second half divided equally among 
the population. Let x   be a distribution obtained from x  in such a way that the second 
incremental rupee in the transition from x to y is split into two halves, with the first half 
distributed in the same proportions as in x  and the second half divided equally among the 
population.  Let x   be similarly derived from x  , …, and so on, incremental rupee after 
incremental rupee, until we arrive at the last marginal rupee and the corresponding 
distribution y  (where, of course, )()( yy μμ  ). Suppose we now require that 
)(...)()()()( yxxxx  IIIII . Then, effectively, we are postulating an 
‘intermediate’ or ‘centrist’ invariance condition which strikes a middle ground between the 
requirements of Scale Invariance and Translation Invariance. Call this property ‘Centrist 
Invariance’, which is a midway requirement between the ‘rightist’ and ‘leftist’ orientations 
of relative and absolute measures respectively. Krtscha (1994) demonstrates that there exists 
an inequality measure - let us call this the Krtscha Measure (K) - satisfying Centrist 
Invariance and a number of other attractive properties, including in particular the property of 
Unit Consistency, which is given, for all Xx , by  
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From (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), it is very easy to see that, for all Xx : 
 
(3.4) )()()( xxx SDCVK  : 
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The (intermediate) Krtscha index is just the product of two very well-known inequality 
measures: the (relative) Coefficient of Variation and the (absolute) Standard Deviation. 
Indeed, as noted in Subramanian (2013b), the product of any relative measure and any 
absolute measure must yield an intermediate measure: this is because an equi-proportionate 
increase of all incomes will leave the value of the relative measure unchanged while raising 
the value of the absolute measure and so raising the value of the product of the two, while an 
equal absolute increase of all incomes will leave the value of the absolute measure 
unchanged while lowering the value of the relative measure and so lowering the value of the 
product of the two - which is the distinguishing property of intermediate measures of 
inequality.  
Briefly, it turns out that a simple product rule is at the heart of an appealing resolution of the 
Variable Size Problem, as reflected in the (sadly under-utilized) Krtscha measure of 
inequality.  
 4. POVERTY AND THE VARIABLE POPULATIONS PROBLEM 
How should poverty comparisons be carried out when they are between variable, rather than 
fixed, populations? The most widely-favoured approach to bridging the transition from fixed 
to variable population poverty comparisons is via the so-called Replication Invariance 
Axiom which requires measured poverty to be invariant with respect to replications of 
income distributions: 
Replication Invariance (Axiom RI): A poverty measure RR:  XP satisfies 
Replication Invariance if and only if, for all Xyx ,  and Rz , if ),...,( xxy   and 
)()( xy knn  for any Nk , then )z;()z;( yx PP  .  
Replication Invariance, in other words, requires us to take a per capita view of poverty. 
Indeed, it is at the heart of comparisons of distributions in terms of such criteria as Stochastic 
and Lorenz Dominance. The most elementary measure of poverty one can think of is some 
headcount of those in poverty. Under Replication Invariance, one would be obliged to take a 
relative view of the headcount, namely a view which focuses on the proportion of the 
population in poverty. Such a view is captured in the very widely employed poverty measure 
called the headcount ratio )( HP which is given, for all  R);( Xx z , by: 
 
(4.1) );(/);();( Q znznzPH xxx  .  
 
A widely-endorsed property of poverty indices is the so-called Income Focus Axiom which 
was referred to in the introductory section of this paper. Income Focus requires a poverty 
index to be invariant with respect to increases in non-poor incomes: 
Income Focus (Axiom IF): A poverty measure RR:  XP satisfies Income Focus if 
and only if, for all Xyx ,  and Rz , if [ )()( xy nn   and 
}{\)( jNixy ii x jj xy &  for some j satisfying zx j  ], then );();( zPzP yx  .  
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The rationale for this property resides in Sen’s (1981) view that poverty is a feature of the 
poor population, and that therefore assessments of poverty ought to be focused on poor 
incomes only. By the same logic, however, one should also endorse a Population Focus 
Axiom - see Hassoun and Subramanian (2012) and Subramanian (2012) - namely the view 
that increases in the non-poor population ought to affect measured poverty no more than 
increases in non-poor incomes:  
Population Focus (Axiom PF): A poverty measure RR:  XP satisfies Population 
Focus if and only if, for all Xyx ,  and Rz , if [ ),( xxy   for any zx  ], then 
);();( zPzP yx  .  
A headcount measure of poverty which satisfies the Population Focus axiom is the absolute 
number, rather than proportion, of the poor population: this is the so-called aggregate 
headcount measure )( AP which is given, for all  R);( Xx z , by: 
 
(4.2) );();( Q znzPA xx  .  
 
We have noted, in the context of inequality measurement and the Variable Size Problem, the 
sorts of logical difficulties that can arise when we seek to combine a principle compatible 
with Scale Invariance with a principle compatible with Translation Invariance. Analogously, 
and in the context of the Variable Populations Problem currently under discussion, one 
encounters a tension between the relative view of poverty afforded by Replication Invariance 
and the absolute view of poverty afforded by Population Focus. In particular, and as shown 
in Hassoun and Subramanian (2012), there exists no poverty measure satisfying the axioms 
of Replication Invariance, Monotonicity and Population Focus. (If z = 2, x = (1,1), y = (1,3), 
and v = (1), then P(x;z) > P(y;z) by Monotonicity; P(x;z) = P(v;z) by Replication Invariance; 
and therefore P(v;z) > P(y;z)  - which, however, contradicts  P(v;z) = P(y;z), as dictated by 
Population Focus.) A corollary to this proposition is that there exists no poverty measure 
which satisfies the axioms of Replication Invariance, Weak Transfer and Population Focus. 
(This follows from the fact - see Hassoun and Subramanian (2012) for a simple 
demonstration - that Replication Invariance and Weak Transfer together imply 
Monotonicity; and we already know that Monotonicity, Replication Invariance and 
Population Focus are mutually incompatible.) Monotonicity and Transfer were seen by Sen 
(1976) as crucially desirable properties of a poverty measure, a view that has seldom been 
challenged in the poverty measurement literature. The fact that neither Monotonicity nor 
Weak Transfer is compatible with the combination of Replication Invariance and Population 
Focus suggests that the latter two invariance conditions are less than wholly appealing. 
Furthermore, one can also call into question the normative appeal of Replication Invariance 
and Population Focus. In particular, Broome (1996) proposed a principle in population ethics 
which he called the Constituency Principle. This is the requirement that in comparing the 
‘goodness’ of alternative states of the world we should only focus attention on the goodness 
of these states for some appropriately identified constituency of individuals which alone is 
regarded as relevant for the comparison. This is a version of a Focus Axiom in poverty 
measurement, which suggests that the only constituency of relevance for a comparison of the 
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extent of poverty in two states of the world is the constituency of the poor in the two states. 
An alternative normative principle one may advance is that the extent of poverty in any state 
of the world should be seen to be an increasing function of the probability of encountering a 
poor person in that state. This is what one may call a Likelihood Principle (see Subramanian 
2002, 2005a and 2005b). Unfortunately, and as a little reflection will confirm, an invariance 
condition such as Replication Invariance violates the Constituency Principle (though it 
satisfies the Likelihood Principle), while an invariance condition such as Population Focus 
violates the Likelihood Principle (though it satisfies the Constituency Principle).  
Notice further that a variable populations principle which is compatible with the Population 
Focus Axiom, and which would also be satisfied by the aggregate headcount measure, is one 
which would require a k-fold replication of an income distribution to be accompanied by a k-
fold increase in the value of the poverty measure. This requirement is captured in the 
Replication Scaling Axiom (Subramanian 2002):  
Replication Scaling (Axiom RS): A poverty measure RR:  XP satisfies Replication 
Scaling if and only if, for all Xyx ,  and Rz , if ),...,( xxy   and )()( xy knn  for 
any Nk , then )z;()z;( yx kPP  . 
In view of the problems of both logical and normative appeal associated with Replication 
Invariance, at one extreme, and Replication Scaling, at the other extreme, there may be a 
case for considering a population principle which is intermediate in orientation between 
these two invariance conditions. Such a principle is the axiom of Felixible Replication 
Responsiveness, advanced in Subramanian (2005a):   
Flexible Replication Responsiveness (Axiom FRR): A poverty measure 
RR:  XP satisfies Flexible Replication Responsiveness if and only if, for all 
Xyx ,  and Rz , if ),...,( xxy   and )()( xy knn  for any Nk , then 
)z;()z;( yx PkP β , where 10  β . 
Notice now that as we move from 0 to 1, we move from endorsement of the Replication 
Invariance Axiom toward endorsement of the Replication Scaling Axiom. It is reasonable to 
suggest that a properly centrist view of poverty, which lies mid-way between Invariance and 
Scaling, is yielded by a value for β  of one-half.  A natural question which arises in this 
context is: how may we operationalize a ‘centrist’ headcount measure of poverty, one which 
strikes a balance between the demands of the headcount ratio and the aggregate headcount? 
Without getting into the details of work done elsewhere, Subramanian (2005a) provides a 
simple axiomatic justification for a ‘flexible headcount measure’ of poverty ( βP ) which is 
given, for all  R);( Xx z , by: 
 
(4.3) )1();( H
β
Aβ PPzP x .  
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When β  is one-half, we obtain a ‘properly centrist’ poverty measure ( CP ), given, for all 
 R);( Xx z , by: 
 
(4.4) )z;(xCP  = )1( HA PP  .  
 
Equation (4.4) is a slightly more elaborate product rule than one proposed by Arriaga (1970) 
in the context of the measurement of urbanization. While the proportion of a country’s 
population living in its cities has conventionally been taken to be an appropriate headcount 
indicator of urbanization, Arriaga also advanced the rival claim of the absolute size of the 
country’s population living in its cities. England has larger cities than Hawaii (contrast 
London and Honolulu), but the import of this fact could be diluted if we went only by the 
proportion of the city-inhabited populations in the two countries. Arriaga’s suggested 
measure of population is one which takes account of both the headcount ratio and the 
aggregate headcount, combined multiplicatively. In the context of poverty measurement, and 
in terms of the notation we have employed, Arriaga’s measure (translated from urbanization 
to poverty) - call it ARRIAGAP  - is given, for all  R);( Xx z , by:      
 
(4.5) );();();( zPzPzP AHARRIAGA xxx  )(/);([
2 z;nznQ xx ]. 
 
ARRIAGAP  can be interpreted as ‘the expected value of poverty’ in a society. To see this, 
consider a dichotomous indicator of poverty status, given by  
1id  if person i is poor; 
     = 0 if person i is non-poor. 
In a population of n persons (constituting the set N) of whom Qn  are poor, the probability 
that any person i chosen at random is poor is given by /nnp Qi  , and the expected value of 
poverty in the community (which is the probability-weighted sum of each person’s poverty 
status) is given by:  
 )N(Ri
Q
)N(Qi
Q
n
1i
ii )0)(/nn1()1)(/nn(dpE  nnQ /
2
ARRIAGAP  .  
The Arriaga measure reflects the simplest of product rules: it is the product of a relative 
headcount measure of poverty (the headcount ratio) and an absolute measure (the aggregate 
headcount): this is exactly analogous to the Krtscha intermediate measure of inequality 
which, to recall, is the product of a relative measure of inequality (the coefficient of 
variation) and an absolute measure (the standard deviation). As noted earlier, and as can be 
seen from (4.4) and (4.5), the measure CP  is a slightly elaborate version of the measure 
ARRIAGAP : one noteworthy difference between the two is that 00  ARRIAGAP PLim H , whereas 
- and perhaps more reasonably - ACP PPLim H 0 . In general, the product rule allows us 
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to realize a useful outcome: when two distributions are indistinguishable from each other in 
terms of the headcount ratio, the decisive ranking is performed by the aggregate headcount; 
and when two distributions are indistinguishable from each other in terms of the aggregate 
headcount, the decisive ranking is performed by the headcount ratio. This, as observed by 
Chakravarty, Kanbur and Mukherjee (2006), is a nice property in a headcount measure 
which avoids the extreme values of relativity and absoluteness encompassed in the 
headcount ratio and the aggregate headcount respectively. 
It may be noted, finally, that Replication Invariance requires (within its domain of 
application) the same sort of value-neutrality which Scale Invariance does (within its domain 
of application). Such cardinal invariance is sensibly replaced by a less demandingly ordinal, 
ranking-related invariance. A requirement of this nature need demand only that if x  is a k-
replication of x  and y  is a k-replication of y , with x and y being of the same 
dimensionality, then [ )()( yx II  ] implies that [ )()( yx  II ]. This is encompassed in 
what may be called the Population Consistency Axiom (Axiom PC) [which Zoli (2009) calls 
the Population Replication Principle, and which has been discussed in Dalton (1920), 
Bossert (1990b) and Zoli (2009)]. Axiom PC stands in the same relation to Axiom RI as 
Zheng’s Axiom UC stands in relation to Axiom SI. It is useful to note that the poverty 
measures AP , CP  and ARRIAGAP  all satisfy the Population Consistency Axiom.  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The present paper has been an essentially expository and clarificatory essay dealing with the 
merits of two very widely-employed axioms in the measurement of inequality and poverty. 
These are, respectively, the Scale Invariance Axiom and the Replication Invariance Axiom. 
The former proposes that inequality is best assessed on a per rupee basis, and the latter that 
poverty is best assessed on a per person basis. In their respective ways, the two axioms have 
championed the cause of a fundamentally relative approach to the assessment and 
measurement of inequality and poverty. 
While these relative approaches continue to enjoy an overwhelmingly popular vogue in the 
measurement literature, they have also been challenged (albeit in a somewhat small minority 
voice) by some practitioners. This paper has briefly reviewed some of the absolute 
approaches to measurement that have been advanced in both the inequality and the poverty 
literature. The paper has also examined some of the logical and ethical difficulties inherent in 
the extreme orientations of any purely relative or purely absolute approach to measurement. 
This has led to an evaluation of intermediate measures that have been suggested in the 
literature. It has also been pointed out that Krtscha’s intermediate measure of inequality 
exploits a simple product rule to express the inequality measure as a function of a relative 
measure (the coefficient of variation) and an absolute measure (the standard deviation). 
Precisely analogously, a poverty measure which is a simple translation of an urbanization 
index due to Arriaga is shown to be a product of the (relative) headcount ratio and the 
(absolute) aggregate headcount. 
It is no doubt true that these intermediate measures reflect some of the vices of their 
respective relative and absolute ancestors, but the combination of these mutually antagonistic 
sets of vices does tend to mitigate their respective ‘stand-alone’ excesses. This paper is an 
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invitation to acknowledge the desirability of incorporating intermediate approaches to the 
measurement of inequality and poverty more routinely into mainstream treatments of the 
relevant theoretical and applied literature. Failing this, Scale Invariance and Replication 
Invariance must continue to remain two prominent elephants in the living room of 
Distributional Analysis. 
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